

UNIQUE JAVON ELMORE, #1454218	§	
VS.	§	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:11cv320
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID	§	

Petitioner, an inmate confined in the Texas prison system, proceeding *pro se*, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition was referred for findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations for the disposition of the case.

Petitioner is challenging his Collin County conviction for delivery of a controlled substance in an amount more than four grams, but less than 200 grams, Cause No. 380-81428-06. On June 29, 2007, a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to twenty years of confinement. The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on February 13, 2009. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his petition for discretionary review on August 19, 2009. Petitioner states that he filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court, which the Court of Criminal Appeals denied without written order on May 12, 2010.

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specified that he placed the petition in the prison mailing system on May 27, 2011; thus, it is deemed filed on May 27, 2011, in accordance with the “mailbox rule.” See *Spotville v. Cain*, 149 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1998). Petitioner claims he is entitled to relief because TDCJ officials are improperly calculating his consecutive prison sentences, he was denied effective assistance of counsel, he is actually innocent, and his conviction is based upon a defective or void indictment. The Government was not ordered to file a Response.

#### Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) was signed into law. The law made several changes to the federal habeas corpus statutes, including the addition of a one year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The AEDPA provides that the one year limitations period shall run from the latest of four possible situations: the date a judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; the date an impediment to filing created by the State is removed; the date in which a constitutional right has been initially recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. *Id.* at § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The AEDPA also provides that the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. *Id.* at 2244(d)(2).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Fifth Circuit discussed the approach that should be taken in applying the AEDPA one year statute of limitations in *Flanagan v. Johnson*, 154 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1998) and *Fields v. Johnson*, 159 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 1998).

In the present case, the Petitioner is challenging his conviction. The appropriate limitations provision is § 2244(d)(1)(A), which states that the statute of limitations started running when the conviction became final. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his petition for discretionary review on August 19, 2009. He did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. In interpreting § 2244(d)(1)(A) in light of Supreme Court rules, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a state conviction “becomes final upon direct review, which occurs upon denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court or expiration of the period for seeking certiorari.” *Ott v. Johnson*, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1999). Under Rule 13.1 of the Supreme Court Rules, the Petitioner had ninety days from the refusal of his petition for discretionary review to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. *See Caspari v. Bohlen*, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953, 127 L. Ed.2d 236 (1994). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused his petition for discretionary review on August 19, 2009; thus, his conviction became final ninety days later on November 17, 2009. Accordingly, the present petition was due no later than November 27, 2010, in the absence of tolling provisions. It was not filed until May 27, 2011.

The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provide that the time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. Petitioner states that he filed an application for a state writ of habeas corpus on April 14, 2010, which the Court of Criminal Appeals denied without written order on May 12, 2010. His state writ was pending for 28 days; thus, the statute of limitations was tolled for 28 days, extending the deadline for filing the present federal petition from November 17, 2010, to December 15, 2010. It was not filed until May 27, 2011 – more than five months beyond the limitations period.

Petitioner responded to this Court’s order to address the timeliness of his §2254 motion. According to his response, Petitioner erroneously believes that his subsequent state writs of habeas

corpus extended the limitations period. The two following state writs, WR-67,300-06 and WR-67,300-07, were dismissed pursuant to Section 4 of 11.07. The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provide that the time during which a *properly filed* application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that “an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” *Artuz v. Bennett*, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 364, 148 L. Ed.2d 213 (2000). It counseled that these rules govern “for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee.” *Id*; *Larry v. Dretke*, 361 F.3d 890, 893 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit interprets the words “properly filed” narrowly. *Lookingbill v. Cockrell*, 293 F.3d 256, 160 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner’s subsequent state applications for writs of habeas corpus were dismissed because they were successive to his first state writ. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not consider Petitioner’s two subsequent applications because they failed to comply with the rules. Thus, the last two petitions were not “properly filed” for purposes of the AEDPA and did not serve to toll the statute of limitations. *Artuz*, 531 U.S. at 8; *Larry*, 361 F.3d at 895 (application erroneously accepted by the clerk of a court will be *pending*, but not *properly filed* if filing prerequisites are not met); *Villegas v. Johnson*, 184 F.3d 467, 470 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999) (concluding that tolling is authorized during the pendency of petitions only if petitions are filed *in accordance with a state’s procedural filing requirements* (emphasis added)); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

The United States Supreme Court confirmed that the AEDPA statute of limitation is not a jurisdictional bar, and it is subject to equitable tolling. *Holland v. Florida*, 560 U.S. —, 130 S. Ct.

2549, 2560, 177 L. Ed.2d 130 (2010). “A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” *Mathis v. Thaler*, 616 F.3d 461, 474 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010) (quoting *Holland*, 130 S. Ct. at 2562). “Courts must consider the individual facts and circumstances of each case in determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate.” *Alexander v. Cockrell*, 294 F.3d 626, 629 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to equitable tolling. *Phillips v. Donnelly*, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000).

The Fifth Circuit has held that the district court has the power to equitably toll the limitations period in “extraordinary circumstances.” *Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson*, 162 F.3d 295, 299 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.1998). In order to qualify for such equitable tolling, the petitioner must present “rare and exceptional circumstances.” *Davis v. Johnson*, 158 F.3d 806, 810-11 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.1998). In making this determination, it should be noted that the Fifth Circuit has expressly held that proceeding *pro se*, illiteracy, deafness, lack of legal training, unfamiliarity with the legal process, and claims of actual innocence are insufficient reasons to equitably toll the statute of limitations. *Felder v. Johnson*, 204 F.3d 168, 173 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir.2000).

As a general rule, equitable tolling has historically been limited to situations where the petitioner “has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective proceeding during the statutory period, or where the [petitioner] has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” *Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs*, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S. Ct. 453, 112 L. Ed.2d 435 (1990). Furthermore, equitable tolling cannot be used to thwart the intent of Congress in enacting the limitations period. *See Davis*, 158 F.3d at 811 (noting that “rare and exceptional circumstances” are required). At the same time, the Court is aware that dismissal of

a first federal habeas petition is a “particularly serious matter, for that dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely, risking injury to an important interest in human liberty.”

*Lonchar v. Thomas*, 517 U.S. 314, 324, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 134 L. Ed.2d 440 (1996).

In this case, Petitioner has not shown that he was induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct. Nor has he shown “rare and extraordinary” circumstances. Consequently, the petition should be dismissed as time-barred.

#### Certificate of Appealability

An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding “unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Although Petitioner has not yet filed a notice of appeal, it is respectfully recommended that this Court, nonetheless, address whether he would be entitled to a certificate of appealability. *See Alexander v. Johnson*, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (A district court may *sua sponte* rule on a certificate of appealability because “the district court that denies a petitioner relief is in the best position to determine whether the petitioner has made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right on the issues before the court. Further briefing and argument on the very issues the court has just ruled on would be repetitious.”).

A certificate of appealability may issue only if a Petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court fully explained the requirement associated with a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” in *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604, 146 L. Ed.2d 542 (2000). In cases where a district court rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, “the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong.” *Id.*; *Henry v. Cockrell*, 327 F.3d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 2003). “When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the petitioner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the petitioner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” *Slack*, 529 U.S. at 484.

It is respectfully recommended that reasonable jurists could not debate the denial of the Petitioner’s § 2254 motion on procedural grounds, nor find that the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed. *Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 134, 154 L. Ed.2d 931 (2003) (citing *Slack*, 529 U.S. at 484). Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court find that Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability as to his claims.

#### Recommendation


It is recommended that the above-styled petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be denied and that this case be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that a certificate of appealability be denied.

Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the magistrate judge's report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations contained in the report.

A party's failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen days after being served with a copy shall bar that party from *de novo* review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and recommendations and, except on grounds of plain error, from appellate review of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. *Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n*, 79

F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (*en banc*).

**SIGNED this 15th day of March, 2012.**

  
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DON D. BUSH  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE